The consensus today is that this equalising of starting points involves a good deal more than well-policed laws against race or sex discrimination. Most people would regard it as somewhat dishonest to say that a poor child attending an underresourced inner-city school has the same opportunities of advancement as a rich child attending a private school; and it has become part of the common sense (so much so that Adam Swift describes this as the conventional view 4 ) that opportunities are not 'really' equal unless societies have neutralised in some way the inequitable effects of social background. For radical egalitarians, this neutralisation can become highly demanding, and equality of opportunity is refined and extended to incorporate a very large measure of social redistribution. In the process, it is often reinterpreted in ways that edge it closer to equality of outcome. There is a line of argument, for example, that accepts that individuals should take responsibility for the outcomes of their own choices -accepts, therefore, that there are justified inequalities -but argues that the 2 John E. Roemer 'Equality of Opportunity: a Progress Report ', Social Choice and Welfare 19/ 2 (2002) , 455-472 at p. 470.
vast majority of so-called choices are taken against a backdrop of unequal resources or inadequate information. This being so, the inequalities justified by individual choice will be very small indeed. 5 Or there is an argument that takes as its starting point that equality of opportunity is a good thing, but says that if a society is seriously committed to equalising opportunities, it will have to incorporate at least some elements of outcome equality. 6 Neither of these takes issue with the underlying principles of opportunity equality, but build on these to arrive at what is more commonly represented as their opposite.
I argue in this paper that this stretching of equality of opportunities lays itself open to criticism for not sufficiently recognising individual autonomy. The great attraction of opportunity equality is that it is supposed to equalise those things for which people cannot, in fairness, be held responsible, while continuing to hold them accountable for what they do (or fail to do) with their opportunities. It is meant, that is, to be sensitive to agency. The question then arises: how far can one stretch the notion before this begins to undermine the perception of people as autonomous beings? The examples I consider all question, in some way, the extent of individual accountability, and incorporate some element of outcome equality into their understanding of equal opportunity. In the process, I suggest, they come up against difficulties regarding the nature and extent of autonomy. I argue that it is difficult to expand equality of opportunity in ways that satisfactorily address the constraining effects of social circumstance, gender socialisation, cultural convictions, and so on, 5 This is the basic structure of Brian Barry's argument in Why Social Justice Matters (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005) . without undermining the idea of people as responsible agents. If so, then a refined understanding of equal opportunity that provides for a larger measure of social redistribution may not be coherent. Running through the paper is the thought that this may not be the best way to go. Egalitarians may have to choose more starkly between a minimal conception of equal opportunities (which will not, for good reasons, satisfy them) or dismissing equality of opportunity as an inappropriate goal. I end with some larger considerations that might make this second the better choice.
.
1.John Roemer and the theory of types
John Roemer's version of equality of opportunity is an obvious candidate here because it explicitly incorporates elements of outcome equality. His central claim is that opportunities are equalised when resources are distributed in such a way as to equalise outcomes among those exerting the same degree of effort: 'I think that under an equal-opportunity policy, individuals who try equally hard should end up with equal outcomes'. 7 His starting point (shared with many, perhaps most, contemporary egalitarians) is that an adequate theory of equality has to be able to differentiate between the choices we make, for which it is only fair that we be held responsible, and the circumstances we happen to find ourselves in. In an early version, Roemer gave the example of smoking. Say we think that people who choose to smoke, against all the evidence and advice of medical experts, should pay some proportion of the costs of keeping them alive. Say we also know that the propensity to smoke is correlated with sex, 'race', and occupation, such that a white female college professor is considerably less likely to smoke that a black male steelworker. In Roemer's reading of this, the black male steelworker can be said to have had less opportunity not to smoke than the white female professor, and is therefore less accountable for his failure. did makes me just a little worse than the median father of another type, who shouts at his kids.') Roemer tries to deal with this worry by distinguishing responsibility from accountability, arguing that individuals can be held morally responsible for their behaviour, even when it is partly determined by circumstances; but should not be held accountable for it, in the sense of being expected to pay. This may help with the case of the inner city adolescent, who should not be made to suffer for a poor attendance record that is hardly her fault. But given the difficulties of identifying any action that 9 is not at least partly determined by circumstance, we seem to be left with virtually no accountability at all.
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What emerges from Roemer's theory of types is a very radical version of equality of opportunity, designed to equalise achievements between types. In some cases, this might be done by equalising levels of achievements: spending three times as much, perhaps, on the education of poor children from the inner city, so that, as a type, they reach the same level of educational qualification as upper-middle class children from the suburbs. In other cases, it will be done by equalising rewards: 14 Phillips 'Defending Equality of Outcome' choice/circumstance dichotomy as the way to get at levels of responsibility. But to be as radical as his theory intends, and yet remain within that paradigm, he has to so much weight the circumstance side that hardly anything remains an autonomous choice. Within this paradigm, the only way to extricate people from disadvantages that should not, in fairness, fall on them, is to establish that they had no choice in the matter. The way to establish this is to show that their actions can be attributed to their circumstances -or in Roemer's terminology, to the behaviour of their type. Being one of a type and being a responsible individual then become mutually exclusive, for those aspects of you that can be attributed to type are not, by definition, attributable to you as an individual. It is this mutual exclusivity that is at the heart of the problem.
Roemer represents both a hard line on the choice/circumstance binary and a radically redistributionist version of equality of opportunity, and can only pull this off by severely reducing the role of personal choice.
Autonomy and gender socialisation
Roemer's theory does not require him to establish what it is about one's circumstances that constrains one's opportunities: he can simply point to observed correlations without claiming to have identified the mechanisms or cause. The more common approach, among those extending opportunity equality to make it more substantial, is to identify the specific obstacles that prevent equality of opportunity and propose policies to reduce or remove them. Quality of education usually figures large among the relevant considerations; and in respect of equality between the sexes, good quality and affordable childcare. Though there is an increasing consensus on the importance of both of these, initiatives to address them typically fall a long way short. In a recent discussion of gender socialisation, Andrew Mason asks us to consider a career-sacrificing mother who is not constrained by the lack of good quality childcare (her partner is able and willing to look after the children while she goes to work), but who actively wants to look after the children herself and/or thinks it is right for mothers, rather than fathers, to do this. 15 The decision carries the usual consequences in terms of loss of income, career prospects, pension, and so on. In the austere reading of equality of opportunity, this woman had her chances and made her choices, and cannot legitimately complain about the long-term costs. In a more sympathetic reading, we might say that she did not really know what she was doing, that she was a victim of her socialisation, and that while 'formally' free to continue with her career, her socialisation effectively eliminated this opportunity. But this is not an especially appealing way forward, for while it rightly challenges a minimal reading of equality of opportunity, it does so at the expense of treating the woman as a less than autonomous being. This is not the route Mason takes. On the contrary, he
formulates his example in a way that is supposed to rule out this option: the woman knows full well that her desire to devote herself exclusively to raising her children is a product of gender socialisation, and yet she still says this is what she wants. He is clear that we should recognise this woman as an autonomous agent, able to choose between a range of options. He rejects, however, the implication that she is then responsible for the costs of her choice, for her behaviour -like that of the men around her -is being shaped by inegalitarian sexist norms.
Mason's target is that strand in contemporary liberal egalitarianism that requires individuals to pay the costs of actions that stem unambiguously from their he does not, however, think it equitable for women's costs as regards the care of children to be so much higher than men's; so he rejects the notion that we should bear the costs for autonomous actions. In the process, he refuses that stark opposition between being either the product of social circumstance or an autonomous choice. He does not have to represent type characteristics and individual characteristics as mutually exclusive.
It seems, then, that Mason has managed it: he has managed to extend the notion of equality of opportunity to address the constraining effects of gender socialisation without thereby undermining the notion of women as autonomous beings. But the example he employs works because it draws on intuitions about society, not just parents, having a responsibility for the costs of raising children; and about most children having two parents, hence it being unfair for only one of those to bear the costs. Given these intuitions, we may be less concerned than in other cases with whether the woman did choose, was responsible, knew what she was doing, for we may feel this is an instance where these are not the most relevant considerations.
Say we changed the example to a career-sacrificing housewife, whose partner is willing to stay at home and clean the house and cook the meals, but who feels it is more fitting for a woman to do this. Here, too, choices are being shaped by inegalitarian sexist norms, but in the absence of children, I suspect that most people will return to a more conventional understanding of opportunity, arguing that since she had the opportunities, knew the alternatives, and still chose this course of action, 
Parekh, Barry, and Miller on cultural incapacity
The issue with regards gender is that obstacles to equality can be internal as well as external. How does one address these within a discourse of opportunity without undermining women's status as agents? Similar issues arise in relation to cultural difference. Part of the case for multicultural policies, particularly for those that have involved exempting members of cultural groups from regulations that would otherwise be binding on all citizens, is that it is harder for individuals from these groups to meet the requirements, hence that the regulations indirectly discriminate against them. The move, in these arguments, is from an equality of opportunity we would all presumably acknowledge (that individuals should have equal opportunities to education or employment regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or culture) to a stronger version that entails a right to certain kinds of cultural accommodation. One landmark case in the UK was Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983) , which involved a Sikh schoolboy who had been excluded from a (private) school because he would not conform to the school dress code. 16 In essence, the school required boys to cut their hair short and wear caps; since it is part of Sikh tradition not to cut one's hair, and for boys and men to cover it with a turban, it was particularly difficult for a Sikh schoolboy to meet this requirement. Commission was that the norms regulating the division of responsibility for childcare mean that many women, and few men, start their careers after a period of looking after children, hence that an age barrier of twenty-eight indirectly discriminates against women. Note that whether the women in question endorsed these norms was not particularly to the point. They might have been Andrew Mason's career sacrificing mothers; but perhaps they were committed feminists who were unable to find good quality affordable child care, or who earnt less than their male partners, and knew it would be less of a loss to the household income if they were the ones to stop work to care for the children. Perhaps (this would be the worst case scenario) they desperately wanted to carry on working, but lived with men who insisted on them staying at home. The legal team did not have to delve into such matters. All they needed to establish was that a combination of well-known and well-documented circumstances made it more difficult for women than men to comply with the age regulation.
In the more complicated Mandla case, the question of endorsement does arise, Where this happens, he sees pressing reasons of equity for exempting members of particular religious or cultural groups from regulations that may be perfectly reasonable when imposed on other citizens.
The difficulty with this is that it seems to depend on denying people's capacity for autonomous choice. If we think of ourselves as choosing -or at any rate endorsing -our religious and cultural convictions, then the analogy with physical disabilities seems strained. As Brian Barry puts it in a critique of Parekh, beliefs 'are not to be conceived of as some sort of alien affliction' 21 and 'somebody who freely embraces a religious belief that prohibits certain activities will rightly deny the imputation that this is to be seen as analogous to the unwelcome burden of a physical disability.' 22 But if we do not think of ourselves as choosing or endorsing our convictions, what has happened to agency? To make the argument hold, it seems that Parekh has to represent religious and cultural beliefs as matters over which individuals have no control. It becomes, in a sense, a matter of circumstance which cultural beliefs we find ourselves with, but once we have them, we must act in accordance with them, on pain of losing a deeply cherished aspect of ourselves. 23 Extending equality of opportunity to apply to cultural dispositions and convictions then seems to depend on a contentious thesis about the power of culture over the members of a cultural group. 
Towards a more radical challenge
Equality of opportunity was once understood as the conservative counter to a more radical 'equality', but has in recent years been adopted by egalitarians of all persuasions. For some, this is a largely strategic matter. They start, that is, with the relatively uncontroversial goal of opportunity equality, then demonstrate step-by-step that it is impossible to achieve even this modest objective without more radically challenging the distribution of resources and power. For others, it has been more a matter of principle, with the emphasis on opportunity ensuring that a crucial balance is maintained between regard for equality and regard for individual choice. But whether for strategic or for principled reasons, equality of opportunity is now commonly asked to bear the burden of ambitiously egalitarian projects. My argument here is that it is not sufficiently robust to carry this weight, and that it is proving hard to stretch equal opportunity sufficiently without calling into question the idea of people as responsible agents. The basic cry of opportunity equality is 'equality in those things for which we are not responsible, and difference in those for which we are', and this means that more substantive equality is almost inevitably linked to less substantive responsibility. what is now conventionally regarded as equality of opportunity, or an approach that more decisively breaks with the opportunity paradigm.
I end with some reasons why it might make sense to engage in this more frontal critique. The first relates to intrinsic desirability. Equality of opportunity is in many ways a mean-minded understanding of equality, an equalising of starting points in a race where the majority must inevitably lose. Saying that everyone should have the same chance to succeed cannot mean that everyone will, and what, then, is supposed to happen to those who fail? One problem they face is the loss of resources;
and if that loss edges them close to the minimum necessary for survival, the fact that they 'brought it on themselves' hardly seems enough of a justification. This difficulty is recognised by most contemporary theorists of equality, who typically combine arguments for equality of opportunity with some minimum platform below which no citizen should fall. But the problem is not merely one of material resources, for those who fail also face the loss of self-esteem. As Michael Young argued many years ago, one of the ironies about equalising opportunities is that the more equal our chances, the less of an alibi any of us has if we nonetheless fail. 27 Failure to achieve (bad enough in itself) then gets magnified into a loss of faith in one's self.
The second point is that equality of opportunity represents as desirable something that cannot, in fact, be achieved. Majority opinion currently favours something more than the minimal -anti-discrimination -interpretation of equality of opportunity, and looks to a more substantive neutralising of the effects of social 27 Michael Young (1958) The third point is that even if it were possible to deliver substantive equality of opportunity, this would not address the differences in social valuation and economic reward that attach to different activities. Equalising opportunities means equalising the chances of doing or becoming X (say, becoming a university lecturer). But it provides no guarantee that Xs will be as well rewarded (even as 'fairly' rewarded) for their work as Ys. That matter is left to the accidents of history and gender and 'race' and the market, which in combination with a multiplicity of other factors determine the relative prices of teaching, caring for the elderly, dreaming up advertising slogans, advising on stocks and shares. Equalising opportunities also does not have a great deal to offer to those who get the opportunities, do their level best with them, but fall foul of an unexpected collapse in the demand for Xs: the ones at the top of the reserve list, who would have succeeded last year, but now must turn their hands to something else.
Equalising opportunities means equalising our chances of the good things in life, but almost by definition, leaves untouched the distribution of rewards between 'good' and 'bad'. To those who regard current wage differentials (including the differential between what gets a wage and what is unpaid) as intrinsically equitable, this will not be a serious objection. But as anyone who has tried to make sense of the conundrums of what counts as skilled work (and why 'men's work' is so much more skilled than 'women's') will recognise, there are many reasons to think that wage differentials do not correlate with differences of talent, or effort, or time spent in education; and that a host of other circumstances enter into the determination of wages.
Roemer's approach to equality of opportunity does address these issues, because it makes the reward structure a function only of degrees of effort, not a reflection of histories of dominance and power. But while his version more radically challenges the current valuation of occupations and activities, it does so, I have 25 argued, at the expense of minimising the space for autonomous choice. Most other versions of equality of opportunity do not even venture onto this terrain. They therefore leave untouched the really big questions about inequality.
